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Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Specter, and Members of the Committee: Thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Patent Reform Act of 2007. I
testify here on my own behalf, and my views are not necessarily those of any institution
with which I am associated.

The issue before the Committee unquestionably involves a great deal of intellectual
property arcana.

Even for many patent attorneys the issue is obscure. In the view of many observers,
however, the question at issue reduces to an elemental proposition of a just system of
laws: That like cases should be decided alike, regardless of the forum in which the case is
heard.1 This issue also potentially implicates the ability of the U.S. patent enforcement
regime to achieve congressional objectives, the availability of high technology products
to U.S. consumers, and the compliance of the United States with its international
obligations. As a result, the current fragmented enforcement regime associated with
process patents is well worth further consideration by the 110th Congress.

The Enforcement of Process Patents

When a patent claim is expressed as a series of steps, it is known as a method or process
claim.2 Traditionally the patent law held that a process claim could be directly infringed
only by the performance of those steps within the United States. Congress has enacted
two statutes that modify this principle, however. Each of these statutes allow U.S. patent
holders to prevent foreign manufacturers from practicing their proprietary processes
abroad; and then importing the product of that process into this country.

The first of these statutes was the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended through subsequent
legislation. That statute makes it unlawful to import into the United States "articles that . .
. are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process covered by
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the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent."4 If the patent proprietor
successfully seeks an exclusion order from the International Trade Commission (ITC), it
may obtain a ban on imported products produced through the infringing process.

Alternatively, under the Patent Act of 1952, as amended by the Process Patent
Amendments Act of 1988 (PPAA),5 a patent holder may bring an action in federal
district court against the importing manufacturer. The prevailing patentee in those
circumstances may obtain an injunction against the importer, along with monetary
damages to compensate for the infringement. As codified at 35 U.S.C. 271(g), a number
of exceptions limit liability under the PPAA. In particular, 271(g) provides that if the
product is materially changed by subsequent processes, or becomes a trivial or
nonessential component of another product, then there is no infringement.

The Kinik Dicta

The 2004 opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Kinik Co. v.
International Trade Commission has resulted in controversy over the scope of protection
afforded process patents.7 The Kinik case involved the 3M Corporation's claims that the
Kinik Company was importing products into the United States from Taiwan that were
made through use of 3M's patented process. The Federal Circuit resolved the litigation by
concluding first, that the ITC had not properly construed the claims of the 3M patent, and
second, that under a proper claim construction, the 3M patent was not infringed.

Although apparently not necessary to resolve the dispute before it, the Federal Circuit
also embarked upon an excursion in statutory interpretation. In addition to its
noninfringement argument, Kinik asserted that its product was "materially changed by
subsequent processes" beyond the alleged use of 3M's patented process. Although this
defense is acknowledged within the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
exceptions set forth in 35 U.S.C. 271(g)(1) and (2) do not apply to proceedings under the
Tariff Act. In support of its conclusion, the court of appeals observed that the legislative
history of the Process Patent Amendments Act provided:
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There is no intention to impose any of these limitations upon owners of products or on
owners of process patents in suits they are able to bring under existing law. Neither is
there any invention for these provisions to limit in any way the ability of process patent
owners to obtain relief from the U.S. International Trade Commission.9

The court of appeals further stated that it would apply Chevron deference in support of
the ITC's conclusion that the exceptions identified in 271(g) do not apply to exclusion
actions.

The Kinik dicta has attracted criticism. With respect to the language from the legislative
history, one commentator has explained that "the most natural reading" of this language
is simply an intention not to constrain the ability of patent holders to obtain exclusion
orders from the ITC, even though similar relief was now available in the federal district
courts.11 Similarly, the notion that "these limitations [do not apply to] owners of
products or . . . owners of process patents in suits they are able to bring under existing
law" suggests that the two exceptions do not apply to charges of process patent
infringement in other, wholly domestic situations.

The application of Chevron deference has also been critiqued. According to one
commentator, "after the Process Patent Amendments Act was passed in 1988, the ITC
consistently and openly recognized the general applicability of 271(g) defenses in
exclusion actions." The ITC's apparently changing views suggest that deference may not
be appropriate, particularly because

"the ITC is not the agency charged with interpreting the Patent Act."

Consequences of the Kinik Dicta

Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit correctly construed the governing statutes in
Kinik or not, recent scholarly commentary has urged Congress to address the fragmented
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enforcement regime that now exists for process patents in the United States.14 This
commentary has identified numerous complications that arise from varying enforcement
possibilities between the ITC and the federal district courts.

First, Congress intended the two exceptions of the Process Patents Amendment Act to
balance the traditional competing objectives that inform intellectual property policy:
Encouraging the labors that result in innovation, on one hand, and disseminating the
fruits of the labors to the public, on the other. The "materially changed" and "nonessential
component" limitations both balance the interests of patent proprietors with follow-on
innovators and also recognize the territorial nature of the patent instrument. These
congressional intentions may not be achieved if the patent proprietor can readily select a
forum where the two limitations upon 271(g) simply do not apply.15

Second, our current fragmented enforcement policy may limit the access of U.S.
consumers to innovative products. As one commentator explains, "[o]ne could argue that
Kinik chafes against the interests of U.S. consumers, consumers who would benefit from
having access to less expensive goods, including everything from medicines to
automobile parts."

Finally, the remedial disparity between the district courts and the ITC potentially favors
domestic industry over foreign firms. Because the availability of an exclusion order is
premised upon the existence of a domestic industry, "[t]here is a clear difference in the
defenses available for foreign goods and importers thereof when compared to their
domestic counterparts, potentially constituting a 'disguised restriction on trade."' Another
commentator observes:

Kinik also has implications for international relations. Since Kinik stands for the idea that
the ITC can lawfully make it significantly harder for a defendant to establish a defense
based on noninfringement in an exclusion dispute, the foreign business community is
likely to view this as an instance of protectionism. After all, the ITC is a body that can
unilaterally exclude foreign products from importation into the United States, a fact that
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will inevitably color foreign perception of the fairness of its procedures. More
specifically, foreign business interests are likely to find unfair (and perhaps hypocritical)
Kinik's refusal to extend 271(g)'s defenses-defenses that all defendants have in U.S.
federal courts-to exclusion actions given the aggregate effect of exclusion orders on the
balance of trade in intellectual property. Foreign businesses are likely to find this policy
unfair (and perhaps hypocritical) .

Although the analysis of whether the current situation constitutes a violation of the
TRIPS Agreement is complex, the perceived favoritism for U.S. industry over foreign
firms may send a conflicting message as the United States proceeds against Israel, China,
and other trading partners for perceived lapses in their intellectual property regimes.

Conclusion

Since at least the publication of Artistotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the notion that like
cases should be treated alike has been viewed as central to the notion of justice. The
disparate results available to process patent holders in the ITC, as compared to the district
courts, has been broadly viewed as violating this fundamental norm of equivalence.
Because these dissimilar rules of law potentially conflict with congressional intent, limit
competition, and portray the United States in a negative light, academic commentary has
expressed "hope that Congress will soon step in to ensure that the fragmented
enforcement regime Kinik endorses is dismantled sooner rather than later." I look
forward to hearing the view of my fellow witnesses on today's panel, and to answering
any questions that may be presented. Thank you.
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